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Abstract
In this paper we describe matching mechanisms for a real-time computational resource exchange market,
Chital, that incentivizes participating clients to perform computation for their peers in exchange for overall
improved performance. The system is designed to discourage dishonest behavior via a credit system, while
simultaneously minimizing the use of dedicated computing servers and the number of verifications performed by
the administrating servers. We describe the system in the context of a pre-existing system (under development),
Vedalia [4], for analyzing and visualizing product reviews, by using machine learning such as topic models.
We extend this context to general computing tasks, describe a list of matching algorithms, and evaluate their
performance in a simulated environment. In addition, we design a matching algorithm that optimizes the
amount of time a participant could save compared to computing a task on their own, and show empirically
that this algorithm results in a situation in which it is almost always optimal for a user to join the exchange
than do computation alone. Lastly, we use a top-down approach to derive a theoretically near-optimal matching
algorithm under certain distributional assumptions on query frequency.
1 Introduction
The concept of decentralized and distributed systems has materialized in many revolutionary real-world applications:
Peer-to-peer (P2P) downloading for file sharing, Bitcoin (BTC) for virtual-currency, and many more. However, there
is yet a similar system under the context of sharing computing resources that has achieved a reasonable level of
success. On the other hand, there is an increasing use of computationally intensive algorithms on personal and
Internet data, especially those developed in machine learning and artificial intelligence research. Typically, in
production systems, these computations are carried out only for large models in a centralized fashion using large
scale cloud computing platforms or high-performance clusters in data centers owned by large corporations. But as
applications of machine learning and artificial intelligence become ubiquitous, there is a need for computing smaller
models given a reasonable amount budget using small computing devices, such as mobile phones in the context of
mobile apps, or office / lab computers in the context of enterprise applications and scientific research.
For such a system to exist, there must be a way for computing nodes to discover each other and exchange computing
tasks. A simple way to make this work is to create a local computational resource exchange market that matches
buyers, who have tasks to compute, and sellers, who can offer computational resources. In this paper, we formalize
this problem and devise a list of matching algorithms, a set of evaluation metrics, and show both empirical and
theoretical properties of these algorithms in our experiment results under the context of computing and sharing
topic models of product reviews.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the background of Vedalia and Chital systems. Vedalia is
a system for computing topic models of product reviews, of which its scalability and performance issues motivated
the design of a computational resource exchange system, Chital. Section 3 formalizes the problem in the general
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2 BACKGROUND
context. Section 4 introduces the key evaluation metrics for performance. The matching algorithms are given in
Sections 5 and 6. Simple heuristic algorithms are given first in Section 5, followed by an empirically stable algorithm
that obtains Nash equilibrium with respect to users leaving the system with high likelihood under many conditions.
We also derive a distributional-based algorithm for matching and present results of several matchers obtained via
simulation.
2 Background
2.1 Vedalia
The Vedalia system [4] was developed in late 2014 as a review analyzer for Amazon products. The system uses
latent variable models (primarily LDA[6]) and natural language processors to analyze and aggregate review text for
display to the user. The Vedalia system overcome the shortcomings of the current Amazon system by representing
each product by its topic distribution. Each topic distribution is then displayed to the user via a word cloud in
order to provide multifaceted information about a product in a way that is intuitive, compact, and aggregate. The
system retains completeness in the sense that the full review set is still available to the user via an interactive
topic-based search feature.
In the next stage we intend to bring Vedalia to mobile phones and expand the system by including review sources
from all over the Internet. However, one challenge we face is the high computation cost associated with topic
modeling. Each modeling process involves thousands of iterations over a collection of product reviews. Thus, a
typical product with hundreds of reviews requires several seconds of dedicated computation on a single core. As
there are millions of products and hundreds of millions of product reviews on Amazon alone [8], maintaining a
centralized architecture for computing topic models is both expensive and inefficient, even using the state-of-the-art
systems such as [2, 7].
2.2 Chital
The Chital system was originally designed to address these challenges by creating a marketplace for topic model
computation. In the original design, the system incentivizes users to share their phone’s computational resource for
topic model computation by giving the users a chance of winning a lottery offered over every time period, taken
from a portion of the advertisement revenue in the Chital mobile app.
In our revised design, we extend its context to general computing tasks. While we are keeping the option of letting
the user opt in or out of the computation sharing system, we no longer use lottery as the primary incentive for that
purpose. Instead, we focus on devising matching algorithms such that it is always beneficial for the users to join
the sharing pool rather than computing the results by themselves.
In our analysis of matching algorithms we assume for the worst case: a lottery system does not exist, and a user
only opts-in to computation for the duration of his task.
Just like every marketplace and distributed computation system, the Chital system has to address the issues of
bad behavior and incorrect results. The following four subsections describe our mechanisms in preventing the
user from reporting false computational result. Malicious users still may, however, potentially gain some benefits
by manipulating the computing capacity measurement (by throttling CPU usage) to a lower value than what it
actually is. Details on an algorithm that empirically obtains Nash equilibrium with respect to users leaving the
system are given in Section 5.4.3.
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2.2.1 Marketplace
A marketplace is constructed in which buyers (those who issue computing tasks) and sellers (those that rent out
their devices’ computational resources to complete task) are matched using a matching mechanism. Each buyer
whose device has sufficient computational power is automatically entered as a seller for their own query. Then, for
each query, we select two sellers with sufficient computational power to build the model, where the sum of the two
seller’s credit is above a predefined threshold. Let c1 and c2 denote the credit of the two sellers, and p1 and p2
denote the perplexity of the sellers’ results. Then the probability of secondary verification is defined as:
1− 1
3
[
1
1 + e−(c1+c2)
+ 2
min(p1, p2)
max(p1, p2)
]
Here, the first term denotes the sum of the two sellers credits, transformed to fall in the range (0,1). The second
term represents the similarity of the quality of the two seller’s results; thus, results of vastly different quality have
a higher chance of verification. From this expression, we see that when both sellers’ credits are infinity high and
their results have the same perplexity, no secondary verification is needed. When both sellers credits are relatively
low and the perplexity match is weak, we must verify that the best of the two results is, in fact, valid. Details on
the secondary verification and model evaluations system are presented in Section 2.2.4.
2.2.2 Credit System
Credit functions as a 0-sum system in which we begin with two 0-credit servers for computation. These servers are
controlled by the Chital system and provide a guarantee that at least two compute nodes will always be available
for building topic models.
Each user that joins the system begins with 0 credit. When building a model, the results of the two client (compute)
nodes selected from the marketplace are compared; the model with the greatest log-likelihood is selected to be
returned to the initial requesting user. A single credit is then transferred from the user that generated the model
with the lowest log-likelihood to the user that generated the model with the greatest log-likelihood. Assuming that
all users are using our software to generate valid results, this creates a system in which each user has an expected
credit 0 over time. However, a “bad” user that sends invalid results in an attempt to get more tickets will almost
always produce the model with the lower log-likelihood, causing the credit distribution to shift from the bad to
good users and increasing the likelihood that results from this bad user will go through secondary verification in
the future.
2.2.3 Lottery System
In our original design, lottery money is allocated after each ad payout period as a fixed proportion of ad revenue
and is fed back into the system to encourage participation in the marketplace. The specific time period between
lottery picks is variable, and depends on the quantity of ad revenue (this avoids having an hourly lottery in which
a user can at most win a few dollars/cents, a potentially insignificant quantity). During a lottery pick, a single user
is sampled at random with probability of winning proportionate to the number of tickets the user has won over the
course of the time period. The full amount of lottery money is then transferred to this selected user via PayPal.
In our new design, the lottery system is no longer an essential component as it is no longer a necessary incentive
for users to participate in the computation sharing pool.
2.2.4 Evaluation System
The evaluation system evaluates the relative quality between multiple results submitted from the computing nodes,
and makes the ultimate decision on their acceptance. Assume we have a set of documents {di = (ti1, ti2, ..., tili)}i=1,...,D
and a topic model {θk = (θik, ..., θDk), φk = (φk1, φk2, ..., φkV )}k=1...K (where D is the number of documents, tij
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is the token at position j for document i, K is the number of topics, V is the size of vocabulary, φkw is the word
probability for topic k, and θik is the probability of i-th document possessing topic k..
There are three types of evaluations:
Validation: Verify that |1 −∑w φkw| <  for all k = 1, ...,K, and |1 −∑k θik| <  for all i = 1, ..., D, where  is
the error-tolerance parameter for the system. If any submitted topic model fails validation, reject the model.
Perplexity: The perplexity is calculated by
pi({di}) = exp(−(
D∑
i=1
|di|)−1
D∑
i=1
log p(di|θ, φ))
p(di|θ, φ) =
|di|∏
j=1
K∑
k=1
φktjθik
In other words, the perplexity is the transformed inverse geometric mean of log-likelihood over tokens given the
model. The perplexity can be evaluated efficiently within sublinear time to the total number of tokens (since φk and
θk are sparse vectors with smoothers). The golden-standard of the perplexity is unknown unless we independently
compute a topic model. However, given two topic model submissions, we can quickly determine which model is
better by evaluating the perplexity on the original set of documents.
Verification: If the credit system determines the submissions are dubious, a verification is performed. The
evaluation system picks a valid model with lower perplexity, run an efficient version of Gibbs sampling [1, 3, 5]) for
a few iterations on a server-side computation cluster, and record the perplexity after each iteration is completed.
If the perplexity deviate from the original model by a substantial amount within these few iterations, it would be
evident that the original model is not converged, thus it should be rejected by the system.
3 Matching Problem
The core of the computation marketplace is the design of a matching mechanism. In this market, a user submitting
computing tasks to the system is called a buyer. A user offering computational resource to complete tasks submitted
by other people is called a seller. A user can be simultaneously be a buyer and a seller at the same time. Naturally,
each user has different computing amount of computing power to offer. In reality the amount of computing power
a user can offer may change over time, but only for a small amount. To make this problem tractable, we ignore the
this and assume there is a way to reliably instantly measure a user’s computing power at negligible cost. However,
in addition to that, a user may control or manipulate this value at any point of time. We discuss this situation in
detail in later sections and propose mechanisms to prevent this.
In the context of Vedalia, each computing task submitted by the buyer must be completed by two sellers indepen-
dently for verification purposes. In the context of general computing task,it is often desirable to make runs of the
same computations for the purpose to avoid local minima (e.g k-mean algorithm, EM algorithm, Gibbs sampling)
in addition to verifications. Consequently, in our discussions of matching problem we assume each computing task
is run twice in total, regardless whether it is run by two different sellers, or by the buyer himself.
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The computational marketplace matching problem has many unique characteristics that are not present in the
traditional settings of matching problems. Namely:
• Both types of vertices (compute nodes and users) arrive online with respect to some probability distribution,
whereas traditional bipartite matching algorithms assume there exist one group of offline vertices and another
group arrives online.
• After a computing node finishes its assigned task, the node may become available again for matching. In
traditional matching problems, once a vertex is matched (or exceeds its capacity/budget as in some variations
of the matching problem, see [9]) it cannot be matched again.
• There are tradeoffs between strategyproofness and optimizing different metrics (see Section 4). Traditional
matching algorithms usually aim to maximize the sum of weights across all matched edges.
Even without these differences, it is known that finding a solution for a general graph matching problem is hard if
one aims for a competitive ratio more than 0.5 ([10]), the baseline using the greedy algorithm. Some recent work
such as [11] has shown it is possible to achieve a competitive ratio of 0.526 for the fractional matching problem
(that a vertex can be divided to multiple “fractions” so as to match to multiple vertices). In our matching problem,
there are some features and structures we can use to outperform the greedy algorithm. For instance:
• A computing node has edges connected to all users whose computing task can be computed by this node
within reasonable amount of time
• Each task submitter is also a computing node
• The distribution of computing power and the arriving time of computing nodes are known.
Formally, the problem is defined as the following: Given a set of computing devices P = {p}, we define the
matching problem on sequence of graphs {Gt} = {(St, Bt, Et)}, where St ⊂ P and Bt ⊂ P are devices acting as
computing nodes (“sellers”) and users (“buyers”) respectively that currently are in the marketplace at time t. Each
buyer b ∈ Bt corresponds to a query q ∈ Qt, and it is possible that multiple buyers may have the same query.
A match m = (q, (p1, p2)) : (p1, p2) ∈ St, q ∈ Qt between two sellers and a query initiates the computation task
contained in the query q to be carried out by devices p1, p2. When a device is performing computation for query
q, it cannot perform computation for any other queries until the computation is complete. When both p1 and p2
finish computations for query q, we call this query completed.
When an existing query q is completed by sellers (p1, p2) between time interval [prev(t), t], the buyers Buyers(q) in
Bprev(t) are no longer present in Bt, and the sellers (p1, p2) are no longer present in St unless p1 corresponds to a
query that has not been completed at timestamp t. New queries arrive in the following fashion: whenever a query
q is completed time t, Buyer(q) initiates a new query at time t+ λ where λ is drawn from some distribution pi(θ1)
with parameters θ1.
Naturally, this corresponds to a continuous time model. Devices share their computing resources when they make
a query (submit a task), and stop sharing when they finish computing their assigned task and have their query
completed, whichever comes later. Our goal is to find a matching Mt = {m} over all times t so to minimize some
value under some constraints (see 4). Here the edges (b, s) ∈ Et contains all the pairs (b, s) such that the computing
node’s computational resource is powerful enough to match with the other user’s computing need.
To summarize, we have following quantities (timestamp t is dropped for simplicity):
• p ∈ P : Computing devices that may join the system as sellers and buyers
• b ∈ B: Current active buyers waiting on query results
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• s ∈ S: Current active sellers providing computation resources
• q ∈ Q: A query carrying a computation task submitted by a buyer
• m ∈M : A matching between a query q and a seller tuple (p1, p2)
• λ ∼ pi(θ1): For each device, the amount of time until the next query is made after the device’s current query
is completed
In addition, we define following quantities:
• Buyer(q): The device that initiated query q
• G(q, p1, p2): The gain for Buyer(q) when query q is matched with sellers p1, p2
• w(q, p1, p2, k1, k2): The total wait time when q is matched with sellers p1, p2, and this matching at k1-th
position waiting for seller p1, and k2-th position waiting for seller p2. The total wait time includes both the
amount of time waiting for a matching to establish and the amount of time during which actual computation
takes place.
• φ(p, q): The amount of computation time for seller p to compute query q
• ψ(p): Time until device p finishes his current computation. If p is not currently doing any computation,
ψ(p) = 0.
• Perf(p) ∼ σ(θ2): The computation performance (measured in tokens/second) of a device p is drawn from a
distribution σ(θ2) with parameters θ2
• Tok(q) ∼ ω(θ3): The size of the computing task associated with query q (measured in number of tokens)
drawn from a distribution ω(θ3) with parameters θ3.
• µ: The number of servers. A server is defined as a computing device that is much faster than others, and
which never submits tasks (thus never generates queries). The inclusion of a small number of servers is helpful
in improving the initial performance of the system when there are very few sellers. Servers are also helpful
for handling queries that have been waiting in the queue for too long.
The problem of optimizing matches over all timestamps is intractable without making an unreasonable number of
assumptions. Consequently, in our algorithm designs we often opt to minimize a quantity for a single time duration
or instantaneous timestamp.
4 Evaluation Metrics
There is no single value that measures the absolute performance of the system. As a result, optimizing for one value
often involves tradeoffs with other objectives. In practice, we believe the following metrics are the most relevant:
• Average wait time: the average amount of time for fulfilling each query. The objective function is ∑q w(q; ·)
where the other variables of w(·) are observed. This metric measures the overall throughput of our system.
A lower average wait time means our system is efficient in maximizing the average rate at which queries are
fulfilled and results returned to the user.
• Maximum wait time: the maximum amount of time taken to complete any query, i.e: maxq w(q; ·). This
metric measures the worst case wait time for any participating user. A lower maximum wait time gives a
guaranteed time bound for any query and often means that computational resources are more evenly shared
across devices.
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• Slow query ratio: the percent of queries that are fulfilled slower than if they were computed by the buyers
themselves. This metric measures the overall incentives for the users to use the system as opposed to doing
computation alone. Lower slow query ratio is desirable in the sense that it means users are more likely to
save computing time by participating in the system. In the event that slow query ration is less than 12 for
every user, we have that for any user submitting a query the most likely scenario is one in which the query
is fulfilled faster than the user could compute the result on his own. This can also be used to identify the
existence of a Nash Equilibrium in which all users benefit from staying in the system.
• Average amount of time saved / wasted: The average amount of time saved / wasted across all queries for
each device. Similar to slow query ratio, these two measurements give deeper insight into how much users
gain by participating the system.
• Net gain / net loss per device, and the number of devices with net gain / loss: These are additional metrics
for measuring incentives to join the system and the stability of the system. In the case of number of devices
with net loss, a value of 0 means that no users received negative average utility for being a part of the system.
5 Heuristic Algorithms
5.1 Nash Equilibrium and Strategyproofness
In designing our heuristics, we pay special attention to two desirable properties of any matching system and op-
timization metric – Nash equilibrium and strategyproofness. In the following discussion we let players represent
devices in the system, where each player’s goal is to minimize the expected amount of time he waits for his queries
to be fulfilled.
Suppose each player in the system has two options: stay in the network and allow the system to handle fulfill-
ment of his queries, or leave the network and self-fulfill all queries. In a state of Nash Equilibrium, we have that the
expected utility of remaining in the system is at least the expected utility of leaving the system. From our player
goals, we have that for each player p∗ the following should hold:
2
∑
qp∗
φ(p∗, qp∗) ≥
∑
qp∗
w(qp∗ , p
(i)
match, p
(j)
match, ki, kj)
Here, each qp∗ represents a query made by p∗, p
(i)
match and p
(j)
match represents matchings made by the system for a
query, and ki and kj represent their respective orderings. Thus, the expected amount of time it takes the matching
system to compute a result for a player should be no more than the amount of time it would take p∗ to perform the
computations himself. As such, in expectation it should be beneficial for each player to remain a part of the system
in order to prevent a scenario in which the fastest devices continuously leave the system, causing a cascading effect.
We define the notion of strategyproofness as such: a matcher is strategyproof if no player can benefit from querying
unnecessary products or misreporting his performance. The first of these follows directly from the fact that we
require a player to wait until his last query is completed to make the next query. Thus, in expectation submitting
unnecessary queries will lead to an increase in wait time and decreased utility of the system for that player.
For the second, we must address two options. In the first, a player attempts to overreport his performance by
completing computations faster than should be possible given his device hardware. From our verification system, a
player who behaves in this way will in expectation have decreased credit, leading to the eventual removal from the
system when the player is identified as misbehaving. On the other hand, it should be the case that a player cannot
benefit by underreporting his performance. In this situation, a player takes longer than is necessary to perform
computations in order to improve his wait times. In order to avoid this, several heuristics are examined that give
priority to faster devices. In this case, it is optimal for a player to report the highest possible performance in order
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to increase his query priority; overreporting will lead to the loss of credit, and thus the optimal strategy is to report
one’s true performance.
5.2 Immediate vs Scheduled Matchers
We examined two primary types of matcher: immediate and scheduled. In an immediate matcher, a matching
event is triggered each time a query arrives or a computation completes. With an immediate matcher, we have the
capability of providing the fastest possible time-to-match, however we may miss more optimal matchings that could
be obtained by waiting for new sellers to make queries and enter the marketplace.
This issue is explored using scheduled matchers, which instead perform matchings at a fixed rate without re-
gard for any events occurring within the marketplace. By performing matchings at a fixed rate, it is sometimes
possible to obtain a better assignment of devices to queries by waiting for a small amount of time and accumulating
a larger pool of sellers. From this, it is often possible to compute a better matching than would have been obtained
by an immediate matcher. For example, consider a matcher that simply matches each incoming query, in order
of arrival time, with the two fastest sellers available. Suppose that we have two idle servers p1 and p2 such that
Perf(p1) = Perf(p2) >> Perf(pi) for all user devices pi. For simplicity, assume all user devices have the same
performance. If queries arrive in order from largest to smallest, our matcher will have to wait for the largest tasks to
finish before starting the next smallest task, and so on. This results in substantial wait times that can be remedied
by performing scheduled matchings, reordering events by task size, and fulfilling queries in ascending order.
5.3 Query Processing Order
The order in which queries are processed in one of the key areas of improvement in designing heuristics. We wish to
reorder and fulfill queries in such a way that optimize for each of our evaluation metrics. Below, we briefly describe
a few heuristics along with the goals of each.
5.3.1 FIFO
In the FIFO ordering, a matcher attempts to fulfill queries in the order in which they arrive. In this way, the FIFO
ordering defines a truly greedy ordering with respect to arrival time. In a real-time system, this allows matchings
to be made extremely quickly. In addition, by ignoring the task size and performance of each seller when ordering
queries we obtain a framework whereby a device cannot misreport his performance in order to improve the priority
of his tasks. Unfortunately, the FIFO ordering suffers from many pitfalls. As a key example, this ordering makes
the system directly dependent on the ordering in which queries arrive, even within a small timeframe. As such,
small variations in query arrival times can result in extremely high variance of wait times.
5.3.2 Minimum Variance
Each arriving query begins with a priority equal to its number of tokens. Then, in each matching round, we order all
unfilled queries in descending order of priority and attempt to fulfill queries in order. After each round of matching,
the priorities of all remaining unmatched queries are doubled. Thus, we attempt to reduce in the variance in the
number of rounds a query remains unmatched while still giving priority to larger, harder to complete tasks.
5.3.3 Hardest to Fulfill
In the hardest-to-fulfill heuristic, we order all unfilled queries in ascending order of hardness to fulfill, defined as
the amount of time it would take the querying device to do the computation alone:
hardness to fulfill = 2φ(Buyer(q), q)
In this way, we give priority to queries that are hardest to compute faster than the querying device could have done
the computation. In this way, we hope to optimize the percent of queries that are returned faster than a device
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could obtained alone, thus moving towards a system in which having all devices as part of the system is a Nash
equilibrium.
5.4 Seller Selection
Once a query is selected as the next-in-line to attempt to fulfill, we have two options. We can match the query
with one or more available sellers, or we can defer the matching of the query until the next round. For each of the
following, we have the option of each performing partial matchings – a single seller can begin fulfilling a query before
the second matched seller is available – or enforcing complete matchings – both seller devices must be available for
computation before beginning to fulfill a query. We also test probabilistic versions of several selectors, where each
query has a random probability of being skipped during each matching round. By adding this random component,
the goal is to maintain a distribution of idle sellers that is more robust to sudden influxes of large tasks, resulting
in better overall performance.
5.4.1 FIFO
In the FIFO heuristic, we match each incoming with the first two sellers in our list. Not surprisingly, this is the
worst of our heuristics by most metrics. While a FIFO selector is in itself strategyproof with respect to performance
misreporting, ignoring the performance of sellers and the task size of queries results in the frequent situation in
which large tasks are assigned to slow sellers. For each of the heuristics below, we attempt to avoid this situation.
5.4.2 Greedy Fastest
In the greedy fastest selector, we match a query with the fastest available sellers. By doing so, we attempt to
maximize the throughput of the system by maximally utilizing the fastest available devices. Interestingly, this
heuristic actually leads to decreased utilization of fast devices. By attempting to quickly satisfy all queries, fast
sellers quickly leave the computation pool and only slow sellers remain in times of high load.
5.4.3 SP Fastest/Slowest On-Time
In order to maximally utilize our fast sellers and minimize the probability that a query is fulfilled slower than the
query device could have computed the result itself (e.g. maximize the probability of “on-time” queries), we propose
two heuristics: fastest on-time and slowest-on time.
In the fastest on-time heuristic, we match a query with the fastest devices such that both matched devices are
fast enough to fulfill the query on-time. If no such sellers are available, we defer matching of the query until the
next round. If the performance of a seller required to fulfill a query is faster than all sellers, we match the query
with the fastest available sellers regardless of their performance.
In the slowest on-time heuristic, we match a query with the slowest devices such that both matched devices are
fast enough to fulfill the query on-time. In the way, we still attempt to fulfill queries on-time while keeping faster
sellers in the system longer and buffering against spikes of large tasks. In doing so, we sacrifice average wait time in
low load situations. However, in the event of high load, the large proportion of available fast sellers results in a net
decrease in average wait time as we better avoid the situation in which large tasks are matched to slower-performing
devices.
In a particular instance of the SP slowest on-time selector, paired with a immediate matcher and hardest-to-
fulfill query reorderer, we empirically show that the result eventually demonstrates Nash Equilibrium with high
probability, such that for each device the best option is to remain in the system to submit queries.
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6 Approximation of Theoretically Optimal Algorithm
In the subsections below, we derive a distributional model under a known query distribution to obtain a model that
allows us to match current queries with future sellers. By doing so, we minimize the expected wait time across all
queries, taking into account the probability that any given seller will query a product and enter the marketplace.
6.1 Theoretical Optimal Solution for Unmatched Queries
Suppose for our optimization metric we choose to maximize the expected gain across all unmatched queries. In
deriving a theoretically optimal algorithm, we assume the following:
1. The query distribution pi(θ1) is known and fixed.
2. The performance of each device is known.
3. Computation time is a deterministic function of device performance and task size, namely φ(p, q) = Tok(q)Perf(p)
for device p and query q.
4. No partial matchings are allowed – a query must be matched to two sellers before either seller computation
can begin.
5. We have an infinite number of products, where each query is of a distinct product.
Then for any matching, we have the following maximization problem:
M∗ = argmax
M∈M
E[
∑
(q,p1,p2,k1,k2)∈M
(2φ(Buyer(q), q)− w(q, p1, p2, k1, k2))]
By linearity of expectation, the maximization problem above is equivalent to maximizing the sum of expected gains
across all possible matchings. Also, note that
∑
φ(Buyer(q), q) is a constant across all possible matchings, and for
optimization purposes we can ignore it. Thus we have:
M∗ = argmin
M∈M
∑
(q,p1,p2,k1,k2)∈M
E[w(q, p1, p2, k1, k2)]
Additionally, we can decompose the wait time for a query w(q, p1, p2, k1, k2) as follows:
w(q, p1, p2, k1, k2) = max(ψ(p1) + β(q, p1, k1), ψ(p2) + β(q, p2, k2)), where
β(q, p, k) = φ(p, q) + τ(p, k)
Here, we define τ(p, k) as the recursive function that represents the total time until device p is idle for the kth
person in line waiting on p. Let q+ denote the query ahead of q in line waiting for device p, and ξk(p) denote the
time until device p becomes idle starting at the time when p finishes computation for the k queries ahead of q in
line. Then:
τ(p, k) =
{
ξ(p) if k = 0
ξk(p) + β(p, q
+, k − 1) if k > 0
From this, we obtain the optimal matching M∗:
M∗ = argmin
M∈M
∑
(q,p1,p2,k1,k2)∈M
E[max(ψ(p1) + β(q, p1, k1), ψ(p2) + β(q, p2, k2))]
= argmin
M∈M
∑
(q,p1,p2,k1,k2)∈M
E[max(ψ(p1) + φ(p1, q) + τ(p1, k), ψ(p2) + φ(p2, q) + τ(p2, k)]
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6.2 Approximation for Exponential Query Distribution
Suppose we assume that queries frequencies follow an exponential distribution with parameter α such that pi(x; θ1) =
f(x;α) = αe−αx. In order to make the above problem tractable, we approximate τ(p, k) with ξ(p) and break or-
dering ties by assigning each incoming query a random priority and ordering conflicting matchings from highest
to lowest priority. Then, given the tasks that can be started after we obtain our optimal matching, we iteratively
recompute the optimal matching on our remaining queries until convergence. By using the expectation possible
future query times, we allow a query to match with future devices and wait for them to appear in the marketplace.
We now utilize our exponential distribution over query frequency to formulate our matching algorithm. Substituting
in our approximation for τ , we obtain:
M∗ = argmin
M∈M
∑
(q,p1,p2,k1,k2)∈M
E[max(ψ(p1) + φ(p1, q) + ξ(p1), ψ(p2) + φ(p2, q) + ξ(p2)]
We then have three cases for our expectation. In the first, suppose both p1 and p2 are idle. Then ξ(p1) = ξ(p2) = 0,
and our expectation is simply the maximum of two constant valued expressions.
In the second case, suppose one of ξ(p1) or ξ(p2) is 0. We then have the expected maximum over a constant-valued
expression and a shifted exponential distribution. As an example, suppose that ψ(p1) + φ(p1, q) > ψ(p2) + φ(p2, q)
and ξ(p1) = 0. Then:
Ef(λ;α)[max(ψ(p1) + φ(p1, q) + ξ(p1), ψ(p2) + φ(p2, q) + λ)]
=ψ(p1) + φ(p1, q) + Ef(λ;α)[max(0, ψ(p2) + φ(p2, q)− ψ(p1)− φ(p1, q) + λ)]
=ψ(p1) + φ(p1, q) + αe
−α(ψ(p1)+φ(p1,q)−ψ(p2)−φ(p2,q))
In the final case, suppose neither device is currently idle. Furthermore, without loss of generality let ψ(p1) +
φ(p1, q) ≥ ψ(p2) + φ(p2, q). Then we have:
Ef(λ1,λ2;α)[max(ψ(p1) + φ(p1, q) + λ1, ψ(p2) + φ(p2, q) + λ2)]
=
∫ ∞
λ=0
αλ(e−α(λ−ψ(p1)−φ(p1,q)) − 2e−α(2λ−ψ(p1)−φ(p1,q)−ψ(p2)−φ(p2,q)) + e−α(λ−ψ(p2)−φ(p2,q)))dλ
=α−1 + ψ(p2) + φ(p2, q) +
1
2
e−α(ψ(p1)+φ(p1,q)−ψ(p2)−φ(p2,q))
From these expressions, we are able to compute the approximate optimal solution by selecting the pairing (pi, pj) for
each unfilled query q that minimizes the expected waiting time, breaking ties using random priorities as described
above.
7 Experimental Results
We implemented several combinations of heuristic match schedulers, reorderers, and selectors for comparison. While
we did successfully implement the distributionally based algorithm in Section 6, the poor scalability of the algorithm
with a larger number of devices precludes it from useful comparison. Each algorithm was evaluated in a simulated
environments using the following configurations: query frequency distribution pi(θ1) := Uniform(0, 1hour), de-
vice performance distribution σ(θ2) := Uniform(1, 100) (tokens per millisecond), task size distribution ω(θ3) :=
Uniform(10000, 5000000) (tokens). The number of devices |P | = 100, 000, the number of servers µ = 2, and the
performance of the servers are fixed at 1, 000 tokens per millisecond. For simplicity, we assume an infinite number
of products such that there is a one-to-one mapping between buyers and queries. For all algorithms we disable
11
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AvgWait (s) MaxTimeSaved AvgTimeSaved SlowRatio
MaxWait(s) MaxTimeWasted AvgTimeWasted MaxNetLoss
InstantSPReversedImproved 114.62 9000 88.986 1.718e-54855.93 -0.401 -0.245 0.0
InstantSPImproved 105.068 9111.65 105.611 2.089e-54818.518 -8.156 -1.631 0.0
InstantSP 105.525 9599 109.314 3.339e-43290.716 -28.714 -3.959 -693
ScheduledSP 113.56 9178.83 89.507 0.001126648.87 -26656.798 -8276 -34598
ScheduledMinVar 53.76 9429 252.329 0.25881864.42 -81794 -27.566 -81807
SelectiveProbablisticScheduledGreedy 61.635 9795 206 0.05714945 -14695 -539 -14695
InstantFIFO 109.865 9679 223 0.2694823 -4537 -153 -11239
InstantGreedy 73 9571 203 0.1631376 -1101 -79 -4346
Table 1: Performance metrics comparison between algorithms. The first three columns are taken from the statistics
over the last ~250000 queries. The last column is taken from the cumulative statistics of the entire run. All units
are in seconds or fractions.
partial matching (allow matching query with one seller first and start computation), except for InstantSPReversed-
ImprovedMatcher and InstantSPImprovedMatcher. For each experiment simulates a full day of simulation and
provides the following: moving average wait time (in groups of 100 elements) with its histogram, raw wait time
with histogram, time saved v.s device performance scatterplot, idle seller performance histogram, slow query ratio
per phone histogram, and match time. We also compute a series of summary statistics, including metrics mentioned
in Section 4 to compare multiple algorithms. The results are shown in Table 1 and figures in Appendix 8 (a missing
subplot indicates lack of sufficient amount of data).
From the results, we can see InstantSPReversedImproved is the most likely algorithm to be in a state of
Nash Equilibrium (with respect to expected benefit of remaining in the system) as it has negligible slow query
ratio, minimal MaxNetLoss, MaxTimeWasted, and AverageTimeWasted in absolute values. The strategy of
matching devices with the slowest sellers that are just good enough is proven to be effective, as InstantSPImproved
is showing consistently better performance in MaxNetLoss, MaxTimeWasted, and AverageTimeWasted.
Partial matching is also proven to be effective by the comparison between InstantSPImproved and InstantSP.
In addition, scheduled matchers appear to be weaker than instant matchers in the presence of good heuristics as
can be seen from the comparison between InstantSP and ScheduledSP. Between those matchers optimizing for
wait time, ScheduledMinVar stands out by a large margin. Probablistic matchers are close in average waiting
time, but the actual computation time is generally much longer than with non-probabilistic matchers. All non-SP
matchers give unsatisfactory results in terms of slow query ratio, time wasted, and maximum net loss. See Figures
in Appendix 8 for details.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
To conclude, we have formulated a new problem space that extends to general situations in which a user wishes to
repeatedly perform low-bandwidth, computationally-intensive tasks. While the Chital system was designed with
LDA in mind, it is easy to see how the system could prove useful in any number of machine learning settings that
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require multiple restarts to mitigate the risk of bad local optima (e.g. neural networks, clustering). We defined sev-
eral evaluation metrics of matcher performance and described heuristics that optimize for these evaluation metrics
while attempting to obtain Nash Equilibrium and enforce strategyproofness of performance reporting and query-
ing. Additionally, we showed how assuming a known distribution over incoming queries can theoretically improve
matcher performance by allowing the matcher to perform probabilistically sound pairings between current unfilled
queries and future sellers.
For future research, it would be interesting to explore the modeling of our optimization problem using physical
systems. For example, we may choose to represent the matching problem as an electrical circuit in which each
resistor represents the amount of time required to complete a task. Additional work on improving the speed of
the algorithm in 6.2 may prove useful in scaling up the algorithm to larger scale, realtime systems. We also wish
to formally prove the state of Nash equilibrium in our SP matchers. While the immediate matching SP slowest
on-time matcher appeared to eventually reach a state in which all users had net positive gain from the system under
our tested situations, a formal proof on the conditions under which this state will be achieved would be useful in
better characterizing the underlying properties of the matcher across a broader class of situations.
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Appendix
Figure 8.1: InstantSPReversedImproved, Beginning of day
Figure 8.2: InstantSPReversedImproved, End of Day
Figure 8.3: InstantSPImproved, Beginning of Day
Figure 8.4: InstantSPImproved, End of Day
Figure 8.5: InstantSP, Beginning of Day
Figure 8.6: InstantSP, End of Day
Figure 8.7: ScheduledSP, Beginning of Day
Figure 8.8: ScheduledSP, End of Day
Figure 8.9: SelectiveScheduledMinVarianceMatcher, Beginning of Day
Figure 8.10: SelectiveScheduledMinVarianceMatcher, End of Day
Figure 8.11: SelectiveProbablisticScheduledGreedyMatcher, Beginning of Day
Figure 8.12: SelectiveScheduledGreedyMatcher, Beginning of Day (earlier interval compared to others due to slow
running speed of this algorithm)
Figure 8.13: InstantFIFOMatcher, Beginning of Day
Figure 8.14: InstantGreedy, Beginning of Day
Figure 8.15: InstantGreedy, End of Day
